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As in the past few years, most of the action in theSupreme Court’s 2013-2014 Term was on the civil sideof the docket. On the criminal side, the undisputed
blockbuster was Riley v. California,1 a seminal ruling about
searches of cell phones incident to arrest. Riley is significant for
several reasons, not the least of which is that it displays the jus-
tices’ understanding of new technologies (at last!) and their
recognition that cases involving today’s technologies are diffi-
cult to decide by simple reference to the brick-and-mortar
world. This article starts with Riley and other Fourth Amend-
ment decisions then moves to the Court’s Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendment rulings and to a smattering of federal crim-
inal and habeas cases. It concludes with a brief preview of the
2014-2015 Term. 
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Court issued an interesting assortment of Fourth
Amendment rulings last Term. Riley was the most significant
holding, though there were also important opinions addressing
traffic stops and anonymous tips, warrantless entries into the
home, and the use of deadly force during high-speed chases.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELLULAR PHONES
Riley v. California, which was consolidated with United
States v. Wurie, involved the searches incident to arrest of two
cellular phones. In the first case, Riley was arrested following
a traffic stop. He had a “smart phone” in his pants pocket.
About two hours after the arrest, a detective examined the con-
tents of the phone. The detective found videos and pho-
tographs, which eventually connected Riley to a shooting. In
the second case, defendant Wurie was arrested for a suspected
drug sale. At the station house, officers seized a “flip phone,” a
now somewhat quaint form of technology, and noticed that the
phone was receiving calls from a source identified as “my
house.” Using the call log on the phone, officers identified the
defendant’s apartment. In a subsequent warrant search, police
seized narcotics, a firearm, and cash. The question in both
cases was whether law enforcement officers could obtain the
data from the cell phones without warrants. In a unanimous
decision, the Court held that warrants are required before
searching cell phones that are seized incident to arrests.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is a primer on the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine, which is an exception to the war-
rant requirement. In Chimel v. California,2 the justices found
that officers who arrest a suspect inside a home may search the
area within the suspect’s immediate control but may not con-
duct a warrantless search of the remainder of the home. Such
an extensive search did not fit within the exception to the war-
rant requirement “because it was not needed to protect officer
safety or to preserve evidence.”3 Then in United States v. Robin-
son,4 the Court applied Chimel to uphold the search of a ciga-
rette pack on an arrestee’s person. Robinson categorically
approved the search without requiring any individualized
showing of need to protect officer safety or preserve evidence.
More recently, in Arizona v. Gant,5 the Court narrowed the
search-incident-to-arrest exception in the context of automo-
bile searches, holding that it authorizes a warrantless search
only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching dis-
tance of the passenger compartment or when it is reasonable to
believe that evidence relating to the crime of arrest is in the car.
Drawing on these cases and others, the Chief Justice derived
the general rule that exempting a type of search from the war-
rant requirement requires an assessment of “the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and . . . the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”6 “[W]hile Robinson’s categorical rule
strikes the appropriate balance in the context of physical
objects,” that rule should not be extended to searches of digi-
tal content on cell phones.7
Officers are free to examine the physical aspects of a cell
phone to ensure that it cannot be used as a weapon. However,
digital data stored on a phone do not pose a risk to officers.
While there may be a risk of destruction of evidence, such as by
remote wiping, officers may take reasonable measures to mini-
mize the risk, such as turning off phones or placing them in
Faraday bags.8 On the other side of the balance, “cell phones, as
a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those impli-
cated by the search of a cigarette pack, wallet, or a purse.”9 The
Court recognized that many cell phones are more like mini-
computers with telephone capability. Phones collect distinct
types of information, such as addresses, notes, bank statements,
and videos, which may tell more in combination that any single
record. In addition, the whole of a person’s life can be recon-
structed through thousands of photographs labeled with dates,
locations, and descriptions, which is different than what may be
gleaned from a few photographs in a wallet. Phones are perva-
sive. “Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a
cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went
about their day.”10 And phones may also link to files stored in
the cloud. For these reasons and others, the Court found that a
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warrant is generally required before a search of a cell phone
seized incident to arrest.11 In so ruling, the justices rejected sev-
eral suggestions for a limited authority to search, such as per-
mitting searches of call logs only (as had occurred in Wurie) or
allowing searches of cell phone data if officers could have
obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart.
Although the case holds that a warrant is generally required
for a search of digital data on a cell phone, the Court was care-
ful to emphasize that other case-specific exceptions may still
justify a warrantless search in an individual case. The exigent-
circumstances exception could support, for example, a search
when a suspect is texting an accomplice about to detonate a
bomb, or a child abductor who has information on his cell
phone about the child’s location.12 The Court’s holding was
unanimous, although Justice Alito concurred to state his views
about the rationales for the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine
and to note that he would be willing to reconsider the question
in this case if legislatures assessed the needs of law enforce-
ment and the privacy interests of phone owners, and drew rea-
sonable distinctions based on categories of information or
other variables.13
Riley is an extremely significant ruling, as the Court itself rec-
ognized. But it has also spawned a number of questions that
courts will need to address. Will evidence be excluded in
searches that pre-date Riley?14 Does Riley generally prohibit war-
rantless searches of digital data in devices other than cellular
phones?15 Does the emphasis on the privacy interests in Riley
indicate that other types of searches of digital data will require
an individualized showing?16 What must be in a warrant autho-
rizing a search of a phone?17 I suspect that articles reviewing
future Terms of the Court will address some of these questions.
WARRANTLESS ENTRIES TO THE HOME—CONSENT
AND CURTILAGE
Officers have long been entitled to search a home, even a
jointly occupied home, if one of the residents consents. Eight
years ago, in Georgia v. Randolph,18 the Court held that a war-
rantless search of a shared dwelling—over the express refusal of
consent by a resident who is physically present—cannot be
deemed reasonable based upon
the consent of another resident.
The question in this Term’s case,
Fernandez v. California,19 was
whether the Randolph rule applied
when one resident granted con-
sent after a non-consenting resi-
dent was removed from the
premises. When officers came to
Fernandez’s door, he stated, “You
don’t have any right to come in
here. I know my rights.” He was
arrested because officers sus-
pected that he had assaulted his co-resident, who granted con-
sent to search an hour later.20 In a 6-3 opinion authored by Jus-
tice Alito, the Court distinguished Randolph and found that the
search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Characterizing Randolph as a “narrow exception” to the
general rule that a resident of a jointly occupied dwelling may
consent to search, the majority emphasized that the physical
presence of the objecting resident was essential to the holding
in Randolph.21 Fernandez was properly arrested, and “an occu-
pant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in
the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other rea-
son.”22 The Court rejected the argument that Fernandez’s ear-
lier refusal to consent should have remained valid. First, the
argument is inconsistent with social expectations; visitors may
well decline to enter a home when one resident objects but
then return and enter when the objecting resident is not pre-
sent. Second, the argument raises practical concerns, such as
how long the objection remains effective, who is charged with
knowledge of the objection, and how a continuing objection
should be registered. Finally, denying the other resident the
power to consent would fail to honor his or her rights and
wishes.23 Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion but also
wrote separately to note his disagreement with the holding in
Randolph and to address an argument that Fernandez had a
right under property law to exclude police.24
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan,
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dissented. They saw the case as
a straightforward application of
Randolph. Fernandez was pre-
sent when he stated his objec-
tion to officers and, one hour
later, they “could scarcely have
forgotten” that he refused con-
sent.25 In their view, conjectures
about social expectations do not
shed light on the constitutional-
ity of the search, given the dis-
tinctions between private inter-
actions and police investiga-
tions. They also countered the
argument that applying Randolph to these facts would pose
practical problems. In their view, police could readily have
obtained a warrant and should have done so. The dissenters
“would honor the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
and hold that Fernandez’s objection to the search did not
become null upon his arrest and removal from the scene.”26
Stanton v. Sims,27 a per curiam decision, is interesting
because it notes (but does not resolve) a Fourth Amendment
question that continues to split the courts. The Court in Stan-
ton found that an officer who entered the curtilage of a prop-
erty while pursuing a misdemeanor suspect was entitled to
qualified immunity in a civil-rights action. The justices
remarked that “federal and state courts nationwide are sharply
divided on the question whether an officer with probable cause
to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home with-
out a warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect.”28 Because
the law on this question was not clearly established, the Court
summarily reversed the court of appeals and found that the
officer should receive qualified immunity. 
TRAFFIC STOPS AND ANONYMOUS TIPS
Navarette v. California29 addressed the question whether a
somewhat spare anonymous tip provided reasonable suspicion
to support a traffic stop. A 911 caller reported that a pickup
truck had run her off the road. The caller provided a descrip-
tion of the truck, location, and plate number.30 An officer spot-
ted the vehicle shortly thereafter and followed it for about five
minutes before pulling it over. Navarette was the driver of the
truck, which contained marijuana. A closely divided Court
upheld the stop and thus the subsequent seizure.
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas noted that by report-
ing that she had been run off the road, the caller necessarily
claimed eyewitness knowledge of Navarette’s dangerous dri-
ving. This basis of knowledge distinguished the tip held to be
insufficient in Florida v. J.L.,31 where an anonymous caller sim-
ply reported that a young black male in a plaid shirt at a bus
stop was carrying a gun. In providing details about the pickup
truck and Navarette’s driving, the tip was closer to that upheld
in Alabama v. White.32 There, an anonymous tipster told police
that a woman would drive from a specific apartment building
to a hotel. The tipster described the vehicle and stated that the
woman would be transporting cocaine; officers were able to
corroborate the innocent details. The Navarette Court also
pointed out that the identification and tracing features of the
911 system provided additional justifications for reliance on
the call. After finding the tip to be sufficiently reliable, the jus-
tices concluded that “the behavior alleged by the 911 caller,
‘viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount[s] to reasonable suspicion of drunk driving.’”33
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) challenged the major-
ity’s conclusion that the tip was reliable as well as the inference
that the driver was intoxicated. The dissenters disagreed that
the information in the 911 call bore sufficient indicia of relia-
bility, particularly as the identity and location of the vehicle
were not based on intimate knowledge. “Unlike the situation
in White, that generally available knowledge in no way makes
it plausible that the tipster saw the car run someone off the
road.”34 Moreover, the caller did not assert that the driver was
drunk. At most, the call conveyed that the driver did some
apparently non-typical thing that forced the tipster from the
road. Finally, the officer who followed the truck for five min-
utes did not observe any traffic violations, which should have
discredited the claim that the driver was intoxicated. The dis-
senters suggested that the Court’s ruling will be taken to mean
that “[s]o long as the caller identifies where the car is, anony-
mous claims of a single instance of possibly careless or reckless
driving, called in to 911, will support a traffic stop.”35
DEADLY FORCE AND HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS
In Plumhoff v. Rickard,36 the justices considered whether offi-
cers could be liable for shooting and killing a suspect and pas-
senger during a high-speed car chase. An officer stopped
Rickard’s car for having only one headlight. When asked for his
license, Rickard sped away. Pursued by police, Rickard reached
speeds of over 100 miles an hour before eventually leaving the
highway and colliding with a police cruiser in a parking lot. Offi-
cers approached on foot, but Rickard continued to maneuver his
vehicle, and officers fired three shots into the car. When Rickard
managed to speed away again, the officers fired 12 more rounds.
Rickard and a passenger died from a combination of gunshot
wounds and injuries sustained during an ensuing crash.37 In a
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unanimous opinion by Justice Alito, the Court found that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation and that, in any event, the
officers would be entitled to qualified immunity from civil lia-
bility.38
With respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court
first revisited Scott v. Harris,39 where the justices found that an
officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by ending a car
chase with a technique that put the driver at risk of injury or
death. Here, as in Scott, “Rickard’s flight posed a grave public
safety risk,” and “the police acted reasonably in using deadly
force to end that risk.”40 Next, the Court rejected the claim that
even if deadly force was authorized, officers acted unreason-
ably in firing 15 shots, noting that “during the 10-second span
when all the shots were fired, Rickard never abandoned his
attempt to flee.”41
Finally, even had there been a Fourth Amendment violation,
officers would still be entitled to qualified immunity. In
Brosseau v. Haugen,42 the Court surveyed lower-court decisions
and held that an officer did not violate clearly established law
in firing at a fleeing vehicle to prevent harm to officers and cit-
izens in the area. Brosseau was not distinguishable on the facts.
Moreover, there was no showing that between the time of the
shooting in Brosseau (1999) and the events in this case (2004),
there had emerged either controlling authority or a robust con-
sensus of cases that would alter the analysis.43
FIFTH AMENDMENT
There were no police interrogation cases on the docket this
year, in contrast to other recent Terms, though the Court
issued a ruling on the privilege against compelled self-incrim-
ination in a different context. There were two additional Fifth
Amendment opinions: a per curiam decision reaffirming basic
principles of the Double Jeopardy Clause and an interesting
opinion about the role of the federal grand jury.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPELLED 
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The self-incrimination case was Kansas v. Cheever,44 where a
defendant unsuccessfully argued that the Fifth Amendment
prohibited the State from rebutting defense testimony with an
expert who had previously examined the accused pursuant to
a court order. Cheever had at one point been charged with a
federal capital charge. He filed a notice that he intended to
introduce evidence relating to methamphetamine intoxication
with respect to his ability to form the specific intent required
for the charged crime, and the District Court ordered a psychi-
atric evaluation. The federal charge was subsequently dis-
missed, and Cheever was prosecuted in state court for the same
killing. At his trial, Cheever put forth a defense of voluntary
intoxication and introduced
expert evidence that his use of
methamphetamine had damaged
his brain. In rebuttal, the State
called the psychiatrist from the
federal case, who testified that
Cheever had shot the decedent
because of his antisocial person-
ality, not because his brain was
impaired from drug use. The jus-
tices unanimously rejected
Cheever’s Fifth Amendment
claim in an opinion authored by
Justice Sotomayor.
Cheever’s argument was based upon an inappropriately nar-
row reading of two prior decisions, Estelle v. Smith45 and
Buchanan v. Kentucky.46 In Smith, the use of a court-ordered
examination violated the Fifth Amendment where the defen-
dant neither initiated the examination nor put his mental
capacity at issue. The Buchanan Court had distinguished Smith
and allowed expert testimony because the defendant had intro-
duced an affirmative defense of extreme emotional distur-
bance, a mental-status defense. In this Term’s case, the justices
rejected Cheever’s claim that voluntary intoxication is not a
mental disease and hence that Buchanan would not apply.
Instead, the Court made clear that Buchanan sets forth a
broader rule: “where a defense expert who has examined the
defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite men-
tal state to commit an offense, the prosecution may present
psychiatric evidence in rebuttal.”47 “Any other rule would
undermine the adversarial process.”48 Though the Court
rejected Cheever’s primary Fifth Amendment claim, the case
was remanded for the state courts to determine whether the
expert’s testimony exceeded the proper scope of rebuttal.49
In addition to Cheever, the justices decided another self-
incrimination case, White v. Woodall.50 But Woodall is more of a
ruling about the scope of federal habeas corpus than the Fifth
Amendment and is reviewed in the habeas part of this article.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Double Jeopardy Clause case, Martinez v. Illinois,51 was
a straightforward reaffirmation of the rule that jeopardy
attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn. The defen-
dant’s trial was continued numerous times; several of the con-
tinuances were due to the State’s inability to locate key wit-
nesses. On the morning of trial, the prosecution participated in
jury selection and then again moved to continue the trial. The
motion was denied. The State told the judge it would not par-
ticipate in the trial, but the jury was sworn. When the prose-
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cution declined to call any wit-
nesses, the defendant’s motion for
a directed verdict of not guilty
was granted. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that Mar-
tinez was never placed in jeop-
ardy because the State had
declared—before the jury was
sworn—that it would not partici-
pate in the trial.52 The Supreme
Court summarily reversed, reject-
ing this “functional” approach to Double Jeopardy: “There are
few if any rules of criminal procedure clearer than the rule that
‘jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn.’”53
And because “the trial court’s action was an acquittal,” Mar-
tinez could not be retried.54
CHALLENGES TO THE GRAND JURY’S PROBABLE-
CAUSE DETERMINATION
Federal law permits a court to freeze the assets of an
indicted defendant if the assets could be forfeited upon con-
viction. In United States v. Monsanto,55 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of such an order so long as it is based upon a
finding of probable cause to believe that the property will ulti-
mately be subject to forfeiture. As the justices explained in the
most recent decision, Kaley v. United States,56 that finding has
two components. There must be probable cause to believe “(1)
that the defendant has committed an offense permitting forfei-
ture, and (2) that the property at issue has the requisite con-
nection to that crime.”57 The Kaleys were indicted in federal
court for transporting stolen medical devices and money laun-
dering, and the government obtained an order freezing certain
assets, including a certificate of deposit that the defendants
sought to use to pay their lawyer. They sought a hearing to
challenge the first part of the grand jury’s determination—that
there was probable cause to support the charges themselves. In
a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court found that
the issue raised by the Kaleys “has a ready answer, because a
fundamental and historic commitment of our criminal justice
system is to entrust those probable cause findings to grand
juries.”58
The majority opinion stands as a strong statement about the
role of the federal grand jury. There is “no ‘authority for look-
ing into and revising the judgment of the grand jury upon the
evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the
finding was founded upon sufficient proof.’”59 “The grand jury
gets to say—without any review, oversight, or second-guess-
ing—whether probable cause exists to think that a person com-
mitted a crime.”60 We rely upon grand jury determinations to
justify other significant decisions, such as depriving suspects of
their freedom. And, said the Court, allowing a judicial chal-
lenge to the grand jury’s probable-cause determination may
“have strange and destructive consequences,” such as pitting a
judge against a grand jury on whether there is probable cause.61
The majority also rejected the defendants’ claim that they
were entitled to a hearing under the Due Process Clause bal-
ancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge.62 While the Court did not
reach the question of whether Mathews applies,63 the justices
concluded that even if it did apply, the defendants would not
be entitled to a hearing.64 The government has a substantial
interest in seizing forfeitable assets without a hearing. While
the Kaleys have a vital interest in retaining counsel of their
choice, an asset freeze resulting in the deprivation of counsel
of choice is only erroneous when unsupported by a finding of
probable cause. The Court’s analysis therefore turned on the
probable value of a judicial hearing to uncover a mistaken
finding of probable cause. They concluded that a judicial hear-
ing would provide “little benefit” because the probable-cause
determination “is not a high bar.”65
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor, wrote a forceful dissent, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.66 The Chief
Justice did not consider a hearing on the seizure to be “mere
relitigation of the grand jury proceedings.”67 “The judge’s
decision based on the evidence presented at the hearing
would have no necessary legal or logical consequence for the
underlying prosecution because it would be based on different
evidence and used for a different purpose.”68 If the judge sides
with the defendants, he will simply hold that the prosecution
has not met its burden at that hearing to justify freezing their
assets. “The Government may proceed with the prosecution,
but the Kaleys will have their chosen counsel at their side.”69
The dissenters were also not persuaded by the majority’s
Mathews analysis.70 They concluded that the government’s
concerns were exaggerated, the value of additional proceed-
ings was significant, and the issues “implicate some of the
most fundamental precepts underlying the American criminal
justice system.”71
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SIXTH AMENDMENT
Hinton v. Alabama72 provided the justices with an opportu-
nity to apply the performance prong of Strickland v. Washing-
ton73 to an attorney error that led counsel to select an unqual-
ified defense expert. Hinton was suspected of killing two
restaurant managers during two separate robberies. After being
identified as a suspect in a third (non-fatal) robbery, officers
arrested Hinton and recovered a .38 caliber revolver. The
State’s experts concluded that bullets fired in all three robberies
came from the same gun. Hinton was charged with two counts
of capital murder. The State’s case turned on whether its
experts could convince the jury that all of the bullets came
from the .38. Hinton’s lawyer knew he needed a firearms and
toolmark examiner. He asked the trial court for funds for an
expert, and the court initially authorized up to $1,000, mis-
takenly believing that that was the limit under state law. In
fact, the applicable statute had been amended to permit a
request for any reasonable expenses. But counsel did not know
that either. He hired the best expert he could find for the
money, even though he knew that his expert was not suffi-
ciently qualified. The defense expert was discredited at trial,
and Hinton was convicted. In a post-conviction proceeding,
Hinton’s lawyer presented evidence from three well-qualified
experts. All three said that they could not conclude that the
bullets were fired from Hinton’s gun. In a per curiam opinion,
the Court summarily reversed the state courts’ denial of relief.
Under the first prong of Strickland, “it was unreasonable for
Hinton’s lawyer to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert
where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on
a mistaken belief that available funding was capped at
$1,000.”74 The “attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is
fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform
basic research on that point [was] a quintessential example of
unreasonable performance under Strickland.”75 This was not a
case about the “hiring of an expert who, though qualified, was
not qualified enough.”76 Rather, the failure was in not under-
standing the resources that state law made available to counsel,
leading him to select an expert that he himself deemed unqual-
ified. The Court remanded for the state courts to assess whether
this deficient performance was prejudicial under the second
prong of Strickland. “[I]f there is a reasonable probability that
Hinton’s attorney would have hired an expert who would have
instilled in the jury a reasonable doubt as to Hinton’s guilt had
the attorney known that the statutory funding limit had been
lifted,” Hinton would be entitled to a new trial.77
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
This Term’s case, Hall v. Florida,78 is an important sequel to
Atkins v. Virginia,79 where the
Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the execution of individuals with
intellectual disabilities.80 The
Florida Supreme Court inter-
preted a state statute to require a
showing of an IQ of 70 or less to
establish an intellectual disability.
Florida judicial decisions establish
that someone who scores above 70
“does not have an intellectual dis-
ability and is barred from present-
ing other evidence that would
show his faculties are limited.”81
Hall, who was convicted and sen-
tenced to death, challenged the strict IQ cutoff. At a sentenc-
ing before Atkins, he introduced substantial evidence of dis-
ability, including school records and expert testimony. At a
post-Atkins hearing, he presented the results of nine IQ evalu-
ations over the course of 40 years, but for evidentiary reasons
the court excluded the two scores below 70. Applying the 70-
point threshold, Hall’s Atkins claim was rejected. The Supreme
Court reversed in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy. 
“This rigid rule,” the majority held, “creates an unaccept-
able risk that persons with intellectual disability will be exe-
cuted, and this is unconstitutional.”82 The Court first assessed
how Florida’s rule comports with medical practices and under-
standings. The medical community defines intellectual disabil-
ity by three criteria: “significantly subaverage intellectual func-
tioning, deficits in adaptive functioning . . . , and onset of these
deficits during the development period.”83 Florida’s rigid rule
contravenes established medical practice in two respects: it
treats an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of intellec-
tual disability when experts would consider other evidence as
well, and it relies on the single numerical score while not rec-
ognizing that the score is imprecise. With respect to the latter
point, the Florida statute defines “significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning” as performance that is two or more
standard deviations from the mean on a standardized intelli-
gence test; with the mean IQ test score of 100, two or more
standard deviations from the mean would be a score of approx-
imately 70 points. However, each IQ test also has a “standard
error of measurement,” or “SEM,” reflecting “the inherent
imprecision of the test itself.”84 The SEM means that a person’s
score is best understood as a range. For example, a score of 71
is considered to reflect a range of 66 to 76 with 95% confidence
and a range of 68.5 to 73.5 with 68% confidence.85 Florida’s
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strict cutoff of 70 does not take
the SEM into account.
The Court then turned to
practices in other states and
found that “[a] significant major-
ity . . . implement the protections
of Atkins by taking the SEM into
account.”86 After reviewing legis-
lation in the various states and
the courts’ interpretation of these
statutes, as well as post-Atkins legislation to abolish the death
penalty altogether, the justices concluded that “every state leg-
islature to have considered the issue after Atkins—save Vir-
ginia’s—and whose law has been interpreted by its courts has
taken a position contrary to that of Florida.”87 Taking into
account the actions of the states, the justices’ own independent
judgment, and the views of medical experts, the Court found
Florida’s strict cutoff unconstitutional. “This Court agrees with
the medical experts that when a defendant’s IQ test score falls
within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error,
the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of
intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive
deficits.”88
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, dissented. They disagreed with the major-
ity’s analytical framework. To assess “the ‘evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of the maturing society,’” one
looks to “the standards of American society as a whole” and not
“the evolving standards of professional societies.” 89 The dis-
senters emphasized that state legislation provides the clearest
evidence of contemporary values. Of the states that impose the
death penalty, they counted 10 as not requiring the SEM to be
taken into account, 12 that consider the SEM, and 9 that have
not taken a definitive position. “These statistics cannot be
regarded as establishing a national consensus against Florida’s
approach.”90 Justice Alito disagreed with the Court’s analysis of
the SEM and also concluded that Florida does in fact account
for the SEM by permitting defendants to introduce multiple
test scores.91 The dissenters were especially critical of the
majority’s reliance on the views of professional organizations.
They raised a number of concerns, including that “the Court’s
approach implicitly calls upon the Judiciary either to follow
every new change in the thinking of these professional organi-
zations or to judge the validity of each new change.”92
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
As usual, the Term included a number of decisions constru-
ing the reach of federal criminal statutes. Two decisions—Bur-
rage v. United States93 and Rosemond v. United States94—are
interesting primers on fundamental aspects of criminal liabil-
ity. This section of the article reviews these opinions in some
detail and then briefly summarizes the holdings in a few other
cases.
The issue in Burrage was actual causation. Marcus Burrage
sold heroin to Joshua Banka, a long-time drug user. Banka died
after a night in which he used the heroin plus a host of other
drugs. Burrage was charged with drug distribution under a
provision containing a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence
when “death or serious bodily injury results from the use” of
the controlled substance. At trial, medical experts testified that
the heroin was a contributing factor in Banka’s death, but they
could not say whether he would have lived had he not taken
the heroin. The statute does not define the term “results from.”
The Court held that “at least where use of the drug distributed
by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause” of
the death or injury, “a defendant cannot be liable under the
penalty enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)
unless such use is a but-for cause of the death or injury.”95
Writing for the Court,96 Justice Scalia reviewed basic princi-
ples of actual causation. A statute providing for liability when
a thing “results” usually requires proof that the harm would
not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.97 The
Model Penal Code also “reflects this traditional understand-
ing,” stating that conduct “‘is the cause of a result’ if ‘it is an
antecedent but for which the result in question would not have
occurred’” and this is “‘the minimum requirement for a finding
of causation when a crime is defined in terms of conduct caus-
ing a particular result.’”98 The justices were not persuaded to
adopt a different standard due to the difficulty of proving cau-
sation in drug-overdose deaths. While several states consider
an act or omission a cause-in-fact if it was a “substantial” or
“contributing” factor in producing a result, the Court declined
to adopt this interpretation of the statute.99 Congress could
have written the statute in these terms had it chosen to do so.
Moreover, in light of the rule of lenity, the Court “cannot give
the text a meaning that is different from its ordinary, accepted
meaning, and that disfavors the defendant.”100
Rosemond addressed the mental state required for aiding-
and-abetting liability. Rosemond was involved in a drug sale.
When a would-be purchaser ran away without paying, either
Rosemond or a co-felon fired a gun at him. Rosemond was
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charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) with using or carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. He
was tried for the § 924(c) count under alternative theories:
either he was the shooter or he aided and abetted the shooter.
The case afforded the justices the opportunity to review the
scope of aiding-and-abetting liability. The majority ruled that a
defendant who does not know that a co-felon is bringing a gun
to a drug sale may not be convicted of aiding and abetting the
co-felon’s act of using or carrying the firearm. 
Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court begins with the actus
reus of the offense. “The common law imposed aiding and
abetting liability on a person (possessing the requisite intent)
who facilitated any part—even though not every part—of a
criminal venture.”101 Rosemond’s participation in the drug deal
satisfied the affirmative-act requirement. But “an aiding and
abetting conviction requires not just an act facilitating one or
another element, but also a state of mind extending to the
entire crime.”102 The intent must reach beyond a simple drug
sale to an armed drug sale. “An intent to advance some differ-
ent or lesser offense is not, or at least not usually, sufficient:
Instead, the intent must go to the specific and entire crime
charged—so here, to the full scope (predicate crime plus gun
use) of § 924(c).”103 That intent will be satisfied when an
active participant in a drug transaction knows that a confeder-
ate will carry a gun. In that case, the accomplice has decided to
join in the venture with full awareness of its scope. However,
for that to be true, the accomplice must know of the firearm in
advance, so he can make the relevant legal and moral choice.
It must be “knowledge at a time the accomplice can do some-
thing with it—most notably, opt to walk away.”104 The Court
rejected Rosemond’s claim that liability should only attach if
an accomplice affirmatively wants a confederate to use a gun;
it is enough that the defendant has, with full knowledge, cho-
sen to participate in the scheme. 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with much
of the majority’s opinion but strongly disagreed with the con-
clusion that a conviction requires an aider and abettor to have
a realistic opportunity to refrain from engaging in the criminal
conduct. In his view, this rule represents an “unprecedented
alteration of the law of aiding and abetting and of the law of
intentionality generally.”105 He wrote that the majority con-
verted what was an affirmative defense into a part of the
required mens rea for the offense.
Two other decisions are worth noting. Paroline v. United
States,106 like Burrage, addresses causation, but in a narrower
context. The majority in Paroline held that a defendant con-
victed of possession of child pornography could be ordered to
pay restitution to the child
depicted in the photographs only
for those losses proximately
caused by the defendant’s offense
conduct. To determine the proper
amount of restitution, “a court
must assess as best it can from
available evidence the signifi-
cance of the individual defen-
dant’s conduct in light of the
broader causal process that pro-
duced the victim’s losses.”107 And
in Bond v. United States,108 the
Court found that the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 does not
reach “a purely local crime: an amateur attempt by a jilted wife
to injure her husband’s lover” by spreading chemicals on a
mailbox, car door, and doorknob, “which ended up causing
only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing with
water.”109 The majority construed the Act not to apply, insist-
ing “on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely
local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive lan-
guage in a way that intrudes on the police power of the
States.”110 Three justices concurred in the judgment; they
would have gone further and found the application of the Act
unconstitutional.111
HABEAS CORPUS
In several recent Terms, the Court has emphasized the lim-
ited scope of federal habeas corpus review. The 2011-2012
Term, for example, was marked by six summary reversals of
lower-court decisions that had granted habeas corpus relief to
state inmates.112 There were two significant cases this Term,
White v. Woodall113 and Burt v. Titlow,114 that again underscored
the limited nature of federal habeas review.
Woodall pleaded guilty to capital charges. At his penalty-
phase trial, he called character witnesses but did not testify
himself. His lawyer asked the trial judge to instruct the jury
that the defendant is not compelled to testify and that he
should not be prejudiced by the decision not to testify. In a 6-
3 opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Woodall Court found
that while a previous case, Carter v. Kentucky,115 required a no-
adverse-inference instruction at the guilt phase, prior decisions
from the Supreme Court did not clearly establish such a right
at the penalty phase. Thus, the state court’s decision was not
“contrary” to clearly established federal law as determined by
the Supreme Court. Nor was the state court’s holding an unrea-
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sonable application of Supreme
Court precedent. To obtain
habeas relief on that ground, a
petitioner must show that the
state court’s ruling “was an error
well understood and compre-
hended in existing law beyond
any possibility for fair minded
disagreement.”116 There was no
such error here. “The appropriate
time to consider the question [of
an instruction at the penalty phase] as a matter of first impres-
sion would be on direct review, not in a habeas case governed
by [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(1).”117 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor dissented, arguing that Carter and Estelle v. Smith118
together compelled a no-adverse-inference instruction at the
penalty phase of a capital trial.119
In Burt v. Titlow, the Sixth Circuit found that Titlow was
entitled to habeas corpus relief due to the ineffective assistance
of her second lawyer, who had advised her to withdraw her
guilty plea and go to trial. According to the Circuit, the state
court’s reason for finding no ineffective assistance—that the
withdrawal of the plea followed Titlow’s assertion of inno-
cence—was based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the
factual record. The Supreme Court disagreed, applying the
“doubly deferential” standard of review of an ineffective-assis-
tance-of-counsel claim on federal habeas corpus. In an opinion
by Justice Alito, the Court found that the record supported the
state court’s factual finding that the new lawyer advised with-
drawal of the plea only after a claim of innocence. After accept-
ing that factual determination, the Circuit’s ineffective-assis-
tance-of-counsel analysis could not be sustained. “Although a
defendant’s proclamation of innocence does not relieve coun-
sel of his normal responsibilities under Strickland [v. Washing-
ton], it may affect the advice counsel gives.”120 The state court’s
conclusion that the advice satisfied Strickland fell within the
bounds of reasonableness under the federal habeas corpus
statute.121
A LOOK AHEAD
So far, the October 2014 Term is a bit light on criminal
cases. But there are a few worth noting.
One well-publicized case, Elonis v. United States,122 arose
from the defendant’s postings on Facebook; the legal issue is
whether a conviction for threatening another person under 18
U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective
intent to threaten. A Confrontation Clause case is on the
docket. The issue in Ohio v. Clark123 is whether a child’s state-
ments to a daycare teacher, who has a mandatory duty to
report suspected child abuse, are testimonial within the mean-
ing of the Confrontation Clause. Another significant case is
Rodriguez v. United States,124 which concerns whether an offi-
cer was lawfully entitled to extend an already-completed traf-
fic stop to bring in a narcotics-detection dog. The case may be
important if it generally addresses extensions to these stops.
Heien v. North Carolina,125 another traffic-stop case, asks
whether a stop violates the Fourth Amendment where the
police officer’s reasonable suspicion is based upon a mistaken
interpretation of law. Finally, Yates v. United States126 is—
hands-down—the most entertaining criminal-law case of the
Term thus far. There the issue is whether a defendant can be
prosecuted under the “anti-shredding” provisions of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act for throwing purportedly undersized grouper
from his commercial fishing boat to avoid being sanctioned for
catching undersized fish. Yes, fish. Grouper.
Fish or no fish, it will be an interesting Term.
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